We study a standard two period economy with one nominal bond and one …rm. The input of the …rm is done in the …rst period and …nanced with the nominal bond, and its pro…ts are distributed to the shareholders in the second period. We show that a sunspot equilibrium exists around each e¢ cient equilibrium. The interest rate is lower than optimal and there is over production in sunspot equilibria, under some conditions. But a sunspot equilibrium does not exist if the pro…t share can be traded as well as the bond. (JEL classi…cation numbers: D52, D53, D61)
Introduction
We consider a simple two period private ownership economy with production. There is a single perishable good in each period, traded competitively in each period. There is a nominal bond market in the …rst period. There is one …rm which uses the …rst period good as input and produces the second period good. Since the revenue is earned in the second period, the …rm needs to issue the bond for purchasing its input in the good market in the …rst period. The households are risk averse, and the technology is convex, so no economic agent favors randomness per se. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the properties of sunspot equilibria of this economy.
Recall that sunspots are theoretical device to model random phenomena which do not a¤ect tastes, endowments of goods and resources, and production technology, within the framework of rational expectations. 1 Such phenomena include for instance price uncertainty, fear of in ‡ation, animal spirits of investors, and the psychology of the markets in general. Under the standard convexity assumptions, a sunspot equilibrium is Pareto ine¢ cient. So in other words, we investigate if and how rational animal spirits cause ine¢ ciency in a production economy.
The existence and the real indeterminacy of sunspot equilibria in pure exchange economies have been investigated extensively. 2 But the production economy has not been studied systematically in this context to the best of our knowledge. Introducing production in an incomplete market setting is known to be a challenge, because the objective of the …rm is not clearly de…ned in some cases. In this paper, we do not try to resolve how this issue should be addressed: instead, we postulate that the …rm maximizes the expected pro…ts. Although no formal justi…cation is given, the expected pro…t maximization appears at least very plausible in the simple setup we study.
Given the postulate, many insights from the case of pure exchange are then valid in the production economy as well, and we shall take advantage of them as much as possible in this paper. After providing a formal description of the model and the de…nition of sunspot equilibria in Section 2, we study the existence problem in Section 3. We shall show that a sunspot equilibrium exists, with only very non-generic exceptions. The idea is very similar to that for the exchange economy with a nominal bond. Since the market clearing of the bond market is enough to establish the general equilibrium of the markets, one can arbitrarily …x the real values of nominal returns depending on the sunspot states, and let the bond price adjust to clear the market.
Except for some knife edge cases, the resulting consumption will be random, and we have a sunspot equilibrium.
A sunspot equilibrium is Pareto ine¢ cient, and there are two sources for the ine¢ ciency. The 1 See the seminal paper Cass and Shell (1983) . 2 See Cass (1992) for a short overview. See also Gotardi and Kajii (1999) , where a real asset instead of a nominal bond is considered.
…rst is distributional ine¢ ciency, which is the focus of the pure exchange models: in e¤ect, households consume according to an extrinsic lottery in the second period, which is welfare worsening.
The second is production ine¢ ciency, which cannot be addressed in the pure exchange models, obviously: the …rm may be producing too much or too little in a sunspot equilibrium. Section 4 is devoted to the question of production ine¢ ciency, which is the main part of this paper.
We establish a characterization result (Proposition 1) which identi…es exactly when over/under production occurs in sunspot equilibria around e¢ cient equilibria. As is often the case in general equilibrium analyses, the standard set of assumptions which guarantees the existence of an equilibrium is not strong enough to tell if either over production or under production is to take place. We argue nevertheless that in usual settings, a sunspot equilibrium tends to exhibit over production: in a sunspot equilibrium, the price of bond is too high, i.e., the rate of interest is too low, so that the …rm produces too much. That is, rational animal spirits tend to cause overproduction.
In Section 5, we extend the model by introducing a market for the pro…t share of the …rm. Of course, if sunspots do not matter, trading pro…t share is redundant since the price of the share must be determined in such a way that the bond and the share are equivalent as assets. But in a sunspot equilibrium, this equivalence might break down and so introduction of the pro…t share market could generate a di¤erent kind of sunspot equilibrium. Interestingly enough, in this extended set up, we show in Proposition 3 that there is no sunspot equilibrium. 3 So if there is a market for pro…t share, there is no sunspot equilibrium and the pro…t share market is redundant and unnecessary in any equilibrium, but there are sunspot equilibria without it. 4 Section 6 contains discussions on a few issues. First we comment on the issue of welfare gains and losses: although a sunspot equilibrium is ine¢ cient, there might be some households who are better o¤ in the sunspot equilibrium than in an e¢ cient equilibrium. 5 Next, we provide a comparison with models with background income risks, which yield results with a ‡avor similar to ours. Finally, we give some remarks on extending our model to allow more than one good in each period and multiple …rms.
The Model
We consider a standard competitive two-period economy with production. There is one perishable consumption good in each period. There is one …rm with an increasing and concave production function f with f (0) = 0; the …rm produces f (z) units of good in the second period (period 3 The argument is a slight modi…cation of the ingenious idea of Mas-Colell (1992). 4 There are other cases where the existence of some markets makes the economy immune to sunspots, but those markets are redundant in equilibria. In a pure exchange setup, Kajii (1997) shows that if there are an enough number of …nancial options there is no sunspot equilibrium and the options are all redundant. 5 Goenka, A. In the …rst period, period 0, a nominal bond which pays o¤ one unit in units of account (say, dollar) in the second period is traded in a competitive market. The bond price in units of the period 0 good is denoted by q > 0. The …rm will …nance its input by issuing bond, which will be held by households. Write B for the amount of bond issued by the …rm, and z h for the amount held by household h. So the …rm raises qB in units of good in period 0, which is used as input.
Consequently, it produces f (qB) units of good in period 1 and is liable for the outstanding bond issued, B dollars.
The real returns of the nominal bond will be determined in the markets, which might be random; the households expect that the price of good in dollars might be random, and then consequently the real value of bond's payo¤ is expected to be a random variable. In other words, the households expect in ‡ation, and the rate of in ‡ation may vary according to the state of the economy. This idea is formally described using sunspots as follows.
At the beginning of the second period, the state of economy is revealed. State s; s = 1; :::; S occurs with probability s > 0. We assume that these are sunspot states. That is, by assumption, the state is publicly observable, and the fundamentals of the economy described so far are independent of the realization of the sunspot state. It is often convenient to refer to the …rst period (period 0) as state s = 0, and we shall follow this convention throughout the paper.
Write p s > 0 for the price of good in dollars when state s is realized. Then r s := 1 p s is the real value of one dollar in state s. By construction, the real payo¤ of the bond per unit is also r s in state s, so we shall refer to r s as the (gross) return of the bond in state s. Since only relative prices matters, we will always set P S s=1 s r s = 1 without loss of generality, i.e., we normalize the prices so that the expected real payo¤s of the bond in units of the period 1 good is one. We shall writer = r 1 ; :::; r S 2 R S + for the vector of returns. Sunspots do not in ‡uence production, but nevertheless, since the real returns of bond may be random, the level of pro…ts depends on sunspots in general. Speci…cally, the realized pro…t is s := f (qB) r s B in state s; in units of good, which will be distributed to the households according the the pro…t share h ; h = 1; :::; H. We assume that the …rm maximizes expected pro…ts; since P S s=1 s = 1 and we normalize P S s=1 s r s = 1, this means that the …rm takes bond price q as given and solves the following problem:
which is a well de…ned concave problem under our assumptions.
Notice that the …rm's optimal decision as well as the maximized level of pro…t is independent ofr. Let (q) be the maximum pro…t given price q, and B (q) be the set of pro…t maximizers.
That is, the …rm will choose B 2 B (q) given bond price q. Then by construction the expected pro…t is (q) = f (qB) B and the level of pro…ts in state s is (q) + (1 r s )B, s = 1; :::; S.
Note that although the expected pro…t must be non-negative since zero production is feasible, ex post pro…t s may be negative for some s. Also notice that the choice of B 2 B (q) is indeterminate as far as the expected pro…t is concerned, but it does a¤ect the randomness of pro…ts in principle. 6 When f is strictly concave in the sense of f 00 < 0 everywhere, B (q) is singleton and in such a case we shall abuse notation to denote the single element by B (q) as well. Note that B (q) is increasing in q. By assumption, the households take random pro…ts~ as given, as well as the other price parameters. Rational expectations then require that random pro…ts are given by an accounting identity~ = (q) + (1 r)B. Since we focus on rational expectations, we assume that the households take the bond supply B and pro…t function as given. Taking this into account, the second period consumption can be written in di¤erent ways as follows:
= e
The preferences of household h are represented by a von Neumann Morgenstern utility func- 
Using the expectation operator E with respect to probability measure ( s ) S s=1 , and denoting with a slight abuse of notation byr and~ the random returns and pro…ts, respectively, the utility function (4) can also be written as
Household h's problem is to choose z h 2 R to maximize the expected utility (4).
Note that both random returns and random pro…ts contribute to the randomness of income in the second period. But recall the property of the second period consumption (2) . We can re-write the utility function (5) further so that the vectorr is seen to be the single source of randomness, as follows:
From this expression we see that, other things being equal, the utility is sensitive to a small change in random returnsr, unless
It is assumed that u h is C 3 , di¤erentiably strictly increasing (i.e., for any x h 2 R 2 ++ , the gradient Du h (x h ) is strictly positive), di¤erentiably strictly concave (i.e., for any
) is negative de…nite), and for each level set, its closure in R 2 is contained in R 2 ++ . The assumption of thrice di¤erentiability is needed since the second derivatives of demand functions are important in our analysis in Section 4. But the reader will see that the di¤erentiability assumption is not essential for the existence problem in Section 3 and for the non-exsitence result in Section 5.
Under these assumptions, the function (4) is concave in z h and the optimal choice is characterized by a solution to the …rst order condition as follows:
where @ @x0 u h and @ @x1 u h are derivatives with respect to the …rst period consumption and the second period consumption, respectively. Using the expectation operator, and taking the property of the second period consumption (2) into account, (7) can also be written as:
where the derivatives are evaluated at e 0 h qz h ; e
The solution to (7) is unique if it exists by the strict concavity of the utility function. The existence depends on the returnsr among others, but since our analysis will be done locally around a competitive equilibrium where the optimal choice is well de…ned, we will simply assume that a solution exists in the relevant domain of the analysis. Denote by Z h (q;r; B) the unique solution to (7) ; that is, Z h (q;r; B) is the demand for bond of household h given prices q andr and the bond supply B of the …rm. Then Z (q;r; B) := P H h=1 Z h (q;r; B) is the total demand for the bond of the households. It may …rst appear unusual that the demand function depends on …rm's choice variable B in addition to prices, but as we have explained above, there is no loss as far as rational expectation equilibria are concerned. Note that since the bond supply function B (q) is a function of q; and so Z (q;r; B) is e¤ectively just a function of price variables (q;r).
The prices endogenously determined in the markets are q andr. Thus the rational expectation equilibrium of this economy is de…ned as follows: Remark 2 Consider the case where the technology is strictly convex and so the supply B (q)
is a singleton for any q. Denoting the unique element by B (q) by convention, the equilibrium condition above can be written as Z (q;r; B (q)) B (q) = 0.
Remark 3 From the property of the second period consumption (2), it readily follows that an equilibrium (q;r) is a sunspot equilibrium if and only if there is some h such that Z h (q;r; B) 6 = h B where B is the corresponding equilibrium bond supply.
The equilibrium condition above says that the bond market clears. As is usually the case, it can be readily shown that if the bond markets clear, all the good markets clear.
When S = 1; our model is a standard two period model of consumption and saving, and so an equilibrium exists and every equilibrium is Pareto e¢ cient. An equilibrium for the case of S = 1 is called a certainty equilibrium. Under our normalization, the real return of bond is one in any certainty equilibrium.
If ( q; 1) 2 R 2 is a certainty equilibrium, it can be readily seen that q;1 is an equilibrium for any S > 1, where1 = (1; :::; 1) 2 R S + . This is an equilibrium where the households think that the sunspot states do not a¤ect the real returns of bond; that is, they expect that the return of bond in units of good is one for sure. Such an equilibrium is called a non-sunspot equilibrium when S > 1. By the fundamental theorem of welfare economics applied to the certainty equilibrium and the risk aversion of households, a non-sunspot equilibrium is Pareto e¢ cient. From now on, we assume that S > 1 to avoid triviality.
Conversely, since there is no uncertainty in production and so the aggregate consumption is independent of sunspots, the risk aversion of the households and the convexity of the technology imply that in any Pareto e¢ cient allocation, the consumption of each household must be independent of sunspots. Hence in particular a sunspot equilibrium is ine¢ cient. But an e¢ cient equilibrium may not be a non-sunspot equilibrium: it is possible that although the equilibrium returnsr are random, the households use the bond to completely o¤set income risks generated by random pro…ts, as will be seen in Example 4.
Existence of sunspot equilibria
We argue that a sunspot equilibrium exists. The intuition for the existence is simple. Basically in this model there are S price variables: bond price q and returns r 1 ; :::; r S , but one degree of freedom is lost by normalization. On the other hand, there is one market, the bond market, which needs to be cleared, since the rest of the markets clear automatically if the bond market clears. So even if the returnsr are arbitrarily …xed, the bond price q can be adjusted to clear the market. But ifr 6 =1, the income will be random and so will the consumption, except for some coincidental cases. Formally, we have the following existence result.
Lemma 1 Let ( q; 1) be a certainty equilibrium, and denote by z h the bond holding of household h and by B the bond issued in the equilibrium. Then (1) there exists " > 0 such that for any normalized returnsr with jr 1j < ", there is a bond price q such that (q;r) is an equilibrium.
(2) Moreover, if z h h B 6 = 0 for some h, then there exists " > 0 such that for any normalized returnsr with jr 1j < ", there is a bond price q such that (q;r) is a sunspot equilibrium.
This result can be shown by a simple continuity argument, so we shall omit a proof. Roughly speaking, ifr is close to1, the aggregate demand function for bond must look very close to the one for the economy with S = 1, and hence in particular there must be an equilibrium (q;r). Moreover, if z h h B 6 = 0, the continuity implies that Z h (q;r; B) 6 = h B where B is the corresponding equilibrium bond supply, so it must be a sunspot equilibrium (see Remark 3).
The condition z h h B 6 = 0 in (2) of Lemma 1 is indispensable. That is, it is possible that an equilibrium exists for any …xedr arbitrarily close to1, but the equilibrium is not a sunspot equilibrium, as the following example shows.
Example 4 Assume that the households are identical. Then in any equilibrium, r s = 1 for every s. In particular, there is no sunspot equilibrium. Indeed, if the households are identical, their choices must be identical by strict concavity. This means that the consumption cannot be random since there is no aggregate uncertainty.
This example is e¤ectively a model of a representative agent, where there can be no trade for risk sharing purpose. It is nevertheless instructive since it implies that our results in the following sections will be relying on heterogeneity of households'characteristics.
But a sunspot equilibrium must exist, generically. As long as there is just a slight heterogeneity in the economy (e.g., households have the same preferences but endowed di¤erently in goods and pro…t share), it is intuitively plausible that z h h B = 0 is unlikely to hold in a certainty equilibrium. In fact, although we do not elaborate on the details, it can be formally de…ned and established that z h h B = 0 is a non generic property as long as H > 1. 7 So we contend that except for non-generic cases such as the case of completely homogeneous agents, a sunspot equilibrium exists around a non-sunspot equilibrium.
Prudence and Over investment
A sunspot equilibrium is ine¢ cient, and there are two sources for ine¢ ciency. The …rst is distributional ine¢ ciency: for a given aggregate supply of the good which is independent of sunspots, households'consumption is a¤ected by sunspots. This aspect of ine¢ ciency has been discussed extensively in the literature of exchange economies, so we do not endeavour to clarify further.
The second is production ine¢ ciency, which we focus in this section: the …rm may be producing too much or too little. More speci…cally, starting with a certainty equilibrium where production is done at an e¢ cient level, we study the level of production in nearby sunspot equilibria, whose existence has been established in Lemma 1.
Before proceeding to a formal analysis, let us build up some intuition …rst. Fix a certainty equilibrium and …x anyr close enough to1 in the sense of Lemma 1. Since the …rm's problem (1) is independent ofr, the supply curve of the bond is unchanged, and hence we only need to examine households' demand for bond at the sunspot equilibrium. Then the key question will be how the demand curve shifts; that is, we need to see if the demand for bond gets larger or smaller underr, other things being equal. If the demand gets larger, then the price of bond must go up to clear the bond market, i.e., the (average) interest rate will go down, which then should induce over production. The case of under production can be understood analogously.
The bond is a risky asset in a sunspot equilibrium so at …rst sight it might appear that the risk aversion implies the demand for the bond should decrease. It is well known however that the risk aversion alone does not determines the sign in a partial equilibrium setting where the level of income is …xed: in fact, it is the magnitude of the relative prudence which plays an important role. 8 Notice there is another general equilibrium e¤ect through pro…ts, since the households'income depend on the pro…t level, which is random. Even if the …rm's activity does not change so that the average pro…t remains the same, ex post pro…ts will be more random which will make the second period income more random. Therefore, in principle this is potentially a complex problem of increasing risks in asset returns as well as background income risk.
On the other hand, risks in returns and pro…ts are perfectly correlated in equilibrium, and hence the problem turns out to be manageable to some extent. Note that in equilibrium the second period income is given by (2): as far as the decision problem in equilibrium is concerned, the household e¤ectively take the average pro…t (q) as given. Moreover, its share of outstanding bond h B is also taken as given, and the household solves a simple investment problem,
To describe the corresponding …rst order condition (8), set:
Then the …rst order condition (8) , is now written as F h (q;r; z h ; B) = 0.
Fix a certainty equilibrium ( q; 1) such that for anyr close enough to1, there is a sunspot equilibrium (q;r). Let z h , h = 1; :::; H, and B be the corresponding bond demand for household h and bond supply, respectively, in the certainty equilibrium ( q; 1). To avoid the uninteresting of zero production, assume that B > 0. Also let x 0 h and x 1 h be the certainty equilibrium consumption of household h in period 0 and 1, respectively.
Choose any returnsr close enough to1 so that there is a sunspot equilibrium (q;r). We …rst ask if the demand for bond increase or decrease as returns change from1 tor, keeping q and B …xed. That is, we ask how the demand curve shifts around the certainty equilibrium.
First we shall establish some basic results on how individual household's excess demand Z h changes. We shall calculate changes when returns gets marginally risky. Writer S for r 1 ; :::; r S 1 , and we shall set r S = 1 P S 1 s=1 s r s = S to keep the normalization E [r] = 1.
Using this convention, de…neẐ h by the rule:
Z h q;r S ; B := Z h q; r S ; 1
for each h: Then our task is to …nd the derivatives ofẐ h with respect tor S , and evaluate them atr S =1 S .
From now on, the derivatives of utility functions are evaluated at the certainty equilibrium: 
where M is an S 1 dimensional positive de…nite matrix determined by probability (thus independent of h).
A proof is given in Appendix. Since h > 0, Lemma 2 says that as a function ofr S , Z h q;r S ; B is locally minimized atr S =1 if h > 0, and it is locally maximized if h < 0.
Thus if h > 0, then forr S close enough to1,Ẑ h q;r S ; B > z h . The demand decreases if
It is useful to develop some intuition about Lemma 2 here. The …rst order e¤ect disappears because of the envelope property. The reason why the second derivative plays a role can be understood as follows. Since we are interested in increasing risks in the sense of the second order stochastic dominance, if the function r 7 ! u 10 h e 1 h + h ( ( q) + B) + r z h h B r is convex, then by the de…nition (10) we have F h q;r; z h ; B > 0. In this case, since F h is decreasing in z h , it follows that the demand must increase. It can be readily seen from (15) 
If household h is absolutely prudent in the sense of u 1000 h > 0, the inequality (17) holds if z h h B < 0, that is, household h is a net lender. So these households will increase the demand for the bond whenr gets random. On the other hand, households with z h h B > 0, a net borrower, the e¤ect is ambiguous. So condition (17) above can be stringent in some setup. 9 Next, we shall study the aggregate demand. SetẐ q;r S ; B := P H h=1Ẑ h q;r S ; B . 9 Thus the logic behind the over production result is di¤erent from background risk models. See Section 6. These results leads us to ask whether or not a natural set of assumptions determines the sign
Lemma 3 If
. Assuming absolute prudence, we would like to assert that it tends to be positive.
The reason is as follows: as we have seen in (17), assuming absolute prudence, we have h > 0 for the net lenders. Of course h < 0 is not ruled out for the net borrowers, and this number could be large enough in absolute value to upset our assertion. But h < 0 occurs for households whose prudence parameter is low, and/or whose net trade z h h B is very small. Or to say the least, constructing an example of under production is not simple. Also, we do have
in a special but interesting class of models of "homogeneous" economy.
Lemma 4 Assume absolute prudence for the second period utility function, u 1000 h > 0 for every h. If all the households' consumption is identical in the certainty equilibrium, i.e., x
Proof. From (13) and (15), Now we are ready to discuss the issue of over/under production. We shall concentrate on two cases: the case of linear technology and the case of strictly convex technology. The analysis for hybrid cases can be done analogously.
Let us …rst consider the case of linear technology: we assume that f (z) = kz for some constant k > 0. Under our normalization, and since B > 0 by assumption, the no pro…t condition implies q = k 1 , and of course the zero pro…t condition ( q) = 0 must hold. Now …xr close enough tõ 1 so that a sunspot equilibrium exists. As we mentioned above, the …rm's pro…t maximization condition is una¤ected, so the sunspot equilibrium prices must be ( q;r).
We have the following result on over/under production in sunspot equilibria. Next we consider the case of strictly convex technology: we assume that f is a C 2 function with f 00 < 0. In this case, the bond supply function is well de…ned, so denote by B (q) the supply of bond when the bond price is q. It can be readily established that B (q) is increasing in q: a higher the bond price means a lower interest rate, so the …rm will produce more and
The idea of analysis is essentially the same as before, except that in this case, shifts of demand function is not enough to identify over or under production, since the excess demand function may be upward sloping around the certainty equilibrium. Recall that B (q) is increasing and B = B ( q) by de…nition. By assumption, Z q;1; B (q) B (q) is decreasing in q at q, so is Z (q;r; B (q)) B (q) by continuity, ifr is close enough tõ 1. Therefore, Z (q;r; B (q)) = B (q) implies q > q and B (q) > B ( q) and so the production level in the sunspot equilibrium is higher than that in the certainty equilibrium. The case of P H h=1 h h < 0 can be shown analogously.
Remark 6 If Z q;1; B (q) B (q) is increasing in q at q instead, i.e., the law of demand is violated at the certainty equilibrium, P H h=1 h h > 0 corresponds to under production and P H h=1 h h < 0 corresponds to over production. Proof. By assumption q = 1, and so the income of the households must be the same. Thus, perfect consumption smoothing must take place, so each household consume x 0 h ; x 1 h = ( e; e). Thus assuming absolute prudence, Lemma 4 implies that P H h=1 h h > 0, and so there is over production in any nearby sunspot equilibrium by Proposition 1.
The Role of Stock markets
Why do we keep the pro…t share …xed in a standard textbook general equilibrium model? An answer would be that one could introduce a market for trading shares, but it does not really matter if markets are already complete: the value of …rm is determined by the no arbitrage condition so that it is equivalent to the bond. Then the share will be a redundant asset in equilibrium, and the households need not trade the share anyway.
But in our setup, it makes a di¤erence. If the share can be exchanged competitively in addition to the bond, it is still the case that the share is redundant in any equilibrium, but there will be no sunspot equilibrium. Thus the certainty equilibria represent all the equilibria, essentially. We shall see this result below.
Let q S be the market price of the share. Denote by^ h the share after trade. Thus the induced utility function of household h is now:
A competitive equilibrium can now be de…ned analogously: (q; q S ;r) constitutes an equilibrium if both the bond market and the stock market clear. An equilibrium is a sunspot equilibrium if the consumption is random for some households in the second period. 10 Clearly, a certainty equilibrium is an equilibrium in this setup: simply set q S = f q B 1 ;
and then the bond and the share are equivalent assets, so set^ h = h for all h. The next nonexistence result is established, by an argument which is roughly the same as that of the standard …rst fundamental theorem of welfare economics: 11 it is always possible to construct a portfolio of the stock and the bond whose payo¤s are independent of sunspots. Using this portfolio, every household's utility could be improved by avoiding random income. Then such portfolio must be too expensive for every household, but this is inconsistent with the market clearing conditions.
Proposition 3
If the pro…t share can be traded in period 0, there is no sunspot equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose there is one, and let q and q S be the bond price and the equity price in equilibrium, respectively. Let B be the bond issued by the …rm in this equilibrium. 
thus (x h ) H h=1 can be attained by reallocating the good available for consumption,
h and the inequality is strict for at least one h whose consumption is random. Now consider the following portfolio: buy 1 unit of share and B units of bond: then in state s, the share yields the total pro…t of the …rm (q) + (1 r s )B, and the bond pays o¤ r s B. So the payo¤ of this portfolio is := (q) + B, which is independent of states, and the cost of the portfolio is q := qB + q S . Since > 0, q > 0 follows by no arbitrage,
So if household h sells the whole h units of the initially owned share and buys 1 x h e 1 h units of this portfolio, then household h's consumption is exactlyx h in every state, which is more desirable. Therefore, if household h follows this activity in the bond market and the stock market, household h's consumption in period 0 must not increase, and must decrease if h strictly prefersx 1 h to x h in period 1: that is, we have x
h , and the inequality is strict for some h. Summing up, we have
On the other hand, the bond market clearing condition implies P H h=1 x 0 h e 0 h qB = 0. So the inequality above implies qB > q S , which is a contradiction to the no-arbitrage condition (19).
Remarks

Welfare Gains and Losses
Consider a certainty equilibrium and a sunspot equilibrium close to it. Although the sunspot equilibrium must necessarily be ine¢ cient, some households may nevertheless be better o¤ in the sunspot equilibrium than in the certainty equilibrium. This point is …rst raised by Goenka -Préchac (2006) in a simple symmetric pure exchange setting, and then it is elaborated in a general exchange economy setup by Kajii (2007) . These papers however do not take production into account. Here we shall discuss how the question of welfare gains and losses can be addressed in the model with production.
There are three e¤ects which determines the economic welfare in a sunspot equilibrium, relative to the certainty equilibrium. First, sunspots make the returns of asset more random, which is bad for all households since they loose a perfect saving device.
Secondly, the equilibrium bond price is di¤erent from the e¢ cient one. As we have argued, the equilibrium bond price tends to be higher in the non-linear technology case, making the expected real interest rate lower in sunspot equilibria. This is bad news for those who save. Consider a typical setup where households are endowed with good in period 0 only, so all the households save in equilibrium. Then this second e¤ect is also bad for all the households.
The third e¤ect is more delicate. A lower real interest rate is good news for the …rm, and the …rm tends to be more pro…table in the sunspot equilibrium. The additional pro…ts are distributed to the shareholders, so this is welfare improving. Especially for those households with relatively large share, the positive welfare e¤ect from this channel can be large enough to o¤set the …rst two negative e¤ects.
To sum up the discussion, we conclude that: (1) a household whose share h is zero must be worse o¤ in the sunspot equilibrium. (2) if the technology exhibits constant returns to scale, then all the households must be worse o¤ in the sunspot equilibrium because expected pro…t is always zero. A formal analysis including other cases appears to be a very interesting research agenda.
Comparison with background income risk models
The sunspot model we developed in this paper has some ‡avor of the so called background income risk model. More speci…cally, imagine that the second period endowments gets slightly riskier, thus states are no longer sunspots, and the real return of the bond is …xed at one. Then by the precautionary saving argument, the saving of each household will increase assuming that u 1000 h > 0 for every household. Therefore, the price of bond must go up and the level of production also goes up, and so this background risk model also explains a higher level of production.
However, a higher level of production in this model does not mean that there is over production. Notice that since the background risks cannot be insured, one cannot hope for full e¢ ciency to begin with. And more importantly, one cannot necessarily say that the higher level of production under background risk is excessive, since there is no benchmark e¢ cient level of production within the model. In our sunspot model, the certainty equilibrium is a benchmark for comparison, and the meaning of over/under production is very clear.
In the background risk model, a relevant exercise close to ours is to check the constrained e¢ ciency of the equilibrium. 12 For instance, suppose the government can control the level of input and output by some criterion di¤erent from pro…t maximization, letting all the other variables be endogenously determined in the markets. Should the government …nd reducing the level of output bene…cial to the economy, one can then argue that there is over production. 
Extensions
To conclude, let us provide a few remarks concerning the single good assumption in our analysis.
If there are multiple consumption goods, the set of sunspot equilibria is still parametrized byr, and we believe that the existence of sunspot equilibria can be established analogously. A potential complication arises due to changes in equilibrium relative prices of goods within each spot markets. This will make the analysis potentially involved, but it appears to us that the nature of the analysis will not change as far as the existence is concerned. 14 The issue of under/over production will become less clear cut, obviously. Nevertheless, we believe that analogous exercise can be done to see if the real interest rate goes down or not due to sunspots.
In the case of multiple goods, it is natural to think of many …rms as well. In the standard complete markets setup, one could regard these …rms as one …rm which does a joint production because of the equivalence of individual …rms' pro…t maximization and pro…t maximization of the aggregated …rm. Then even in the sunspot set up, as long as we assume expected pro…t maximization, the same argument would work. However, for the non-existence result (Proposition 3), such aggregation is not neutral. If each consumption good is produced by one …rm, and if all the …rms'shares are traded in their respective markets, then the non-existence result will still hold. Then, it means that the aggregation of production side does not work as in the complete markets. There seems to be many interesting directions for further research. 
Appendix A Proof of Lemma 2
We shall give a proof without time additive separability assumption. The reader then will see that the other results reported in the main text can readily be shown without the separability assumption.
Fix a certainty equilibrium ( q; 1) and denote by B and z h , h = 1; :::; H, the bond supply and the demand in the equilibrium, respectively. For each h, let ). That is, F h (q;r; z h ; B) = 0 is the …rst order condition for utility maximization. Thus by construction, 
where the derivatives are evaluated at q;1; z h ; B .
To keep the normalization E [r] = 1; as in the main text writer S for r 1 ; :::; r S 1 , and de…ne h r S ; z h for each h by the rule:
h r S ; z h := F h q; r S ; 1 Under our maintained assumptions on the utility function, the change in the modi…ed demandẐ h q; ; B (see (11) ) is given by the implicit function theorem applied to the identity h r S ; z h = 0:
First, we shall show that 
The two matrices consisting of ( 1 ; :::; S ) in (24) are both positive de…nite, and they are determined by probabilities only. Thus we have established the desired property of 
